In market games the one to one correspondence between commodity types and trading posts would be justified if it were true that the set of equilibria is not affected by the number of trading posts postulated at the ouset of the model. We show that this is not true.

The authors study market games with multiple posts per commodity. They provide some facts that characterize prices of commodities across posts and show some interesting results.

This paper proposes a general framework for analyzing commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles, based on three possible tax spillovers, the consumer price spillover, the producer price/terms of trade spillover, and rent spillovers. A model is presented which can be...

We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an inform tion advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses dominantstrategy. A dominant strategy is in fact unique and is given by the conditional...

This paper studies utility interdependence in the laboratory. We design an experiment where subjects can reduce ("burn") other subjects' money. Those who burn the money of others have to give up some of their own cash. Despite this cost, and contrary to the assumptions of economics textbooks,...

We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. This class of common-value auctions is characterized by the property that each player's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable,...

This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium.

We show that in a duopoly operating in a congested market, with a general congestion function and an arbitrary distribution of consumer disutility for congestion, there cannot exist an asymmetrict Nash equilibrium. We also show tha whenever an equilibrium does exisq it is unique. Closed...

This paper analyses the situation of an incumbent monopoly who has both to signal that her costs are low in order to dissuade entry tomorrow, and that her product has a high quality in order to attract consumers in the current period. The incumbent can use both price and advertising as signals....

In this paper we study an experiment with human agents strategically interacting in a game characterized by continuous time and continuous strategy space. The research is focused in studying the agents interaction dynamic under different experimental settings. The agents play a two person game...