Using quasi-experimental variation created by a Pakistani tax reform and administrative data, I estimate behavioral responses to taxation in a low tax capacity environment. I find that taxpayers engage in tax evasion, move into informality, and shift earnings to tax-favored business forms in...

The emerging evidence from developing countries suggests that the costs of evasion there are roughly a reverse-L-shaped function of earnings: they are extremely low up to a given threshold and then rise sharply with evasion. Embedding such evasion costs into the standard model generates a...

Using a series of Pakistani tax reforms and administrative records, I document that taxable income responses induced by to-zero tax cuts are orders of magnitude larger than ones induced by similar-sized other cuts. This finding is remarkably robust to alternative specifications and holds for...

We examine two Pakistani programs to explore the role of deterrence as well as social and psychological factors in the tax compliance behavior of agents. In the first of these programs, the government began revealing income tax paid by every taxpayer in the country. The second program publicly...

We examine two Pakistani programs to explore the role of deterrence as well as social and psychological factors in the tax compliance behavior of agents. In the first of these programs, the government began revealing income tax paid by every taxpayer in the country. The second program publicly...

This paper analyzes the effects of personal income taxation on earnings, formality and business organization choices of agents. I use a tax reform introduced in Pakistan in 2009, which increased taxation of partnership firms substantially relative to other unincorporated firms, as a natural...