We analyze a situation where a Principal does not necessarily have all the bargaining power while negotiating a contract with an Agent by studying a dynamic multi-objective moral hazard model with hidden action. We .nd that the structure of the optimal contracts change along the Pareto Frontier,...

In this article, a dynamic Principal–Agent model with discrete actions is analysed from a Multi-Objective optimization framework. As a result, a concave Pareto Frontier is numerically approximated. The concavity of the Pareto Frontier is a consequence of the information asymmetry between the...

In this paper we formulate an infinitely repeated Principal-Agent relationship as a Multi-Objective Optimization problem. We numerically approximate the solution of this model using a Multi-Objective Optimization Evolutionary Algorithm, named RankMOEA, for different values of the Agent's...

In this paper we formulate an infinitely repeated Principal-Agent relationship as a Multi-Objective Optimization problem. We numerically approximate the solution of this model using a Multi-Objective Optimization Evolutionary Algorithm, named RankMOEA, for different values of the Agent's...