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Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010 - First Version: January 2002; Revised, February 2010
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensationbased and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822070
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Delegated Contracting
Feltham, Gerald A. - 2008
, and analyze the principal's delegation choice to authorize a senior agent to contract with a junior agent based on reports …. We consider full-commitment contracts, i.e., the principal is assured that his contract for each agent is implemented … decentralized contract are driven by their incentives to share risk, and by their incentives to re-allocate their effort choices, i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012726431
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An Empirical Analysis of Risk, Incentives and the Delegation of Worker Authority
DeVaro, Jed - 2010
workers' environments and incentive pay. The authors employ Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of … delegation of worker decision rights …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137206
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When pay increases are not enough : the economic value of wage Delegation in the field
Jeworrek, Sabrina; Mertins, Vanessa - 2014
By conducting a natural field experiment, we test whether a managerial policy of allowing employees to self-determine their wages is as successful as recently suggested by laboratory evidence. We find that this policy indeed enhances performance. However, our data is clearly at odds with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354002
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Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority
Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensation-based and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014197745
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Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority
Englmaier, Florian - 2010
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensation-based and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146792
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Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010
principal may delegate additional authority in order to screen for managers of high ability. -- agency problems ; delegation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942661
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Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts
Goldlücke, Susanne; Kranz, Sebastian - In: Economics letters 117 (2012) 2, pp. 405-407
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009674733
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On delegation under relational contracts
Gürtler, Oliver (contributor) - 2005
therefore considers the advantages and disadvantages of two different kinds of job design, partial delegation and complete … delegation with specialization, when the parties make use of both, formal and informal agreements. It is found that many of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003185753
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Delegating relational contracts to corruptible intermediarie
Troya-Martinez, Marta; Wren-Lewis, Liam - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686297