We present a theoretical model of startup signaling with multiple signals and potential differences in external investor preferences. For a novel sample of technology incubator startups, we empirically examine the use of patents and founder, friends, and family (FFF) money as such signals,...

University technology transfer offices (TTOs), whichfacilitate and manage the disclosure and licensing of inventions withcommercial potential, must balance the objectives of the university that ownsthe inventions and those of the faculty who create them.A theoreticalmodel of disclosure and...

We construct a dynamic model of university research that allows us to examine recent concerns that financial incentives associated with university patent licensing are detrimental to the traditional mission of US research universities. We assume a principal-agent framework in which the...

The effects of appropriability on invention have been well studied, at least since Arrow (1962), but there has been little analysis of the effect of approbriability on the commercialization of existing inventions. Exploiting a database of 966 attempts by private firms to commercialize inventions...

At least since Arrow (1962), economists have believed that strong property rights are necessary for firms to invest in innovation. This belief was a key principle underlying the Bayh-Dole Act, which gave universities the right to own and license federally funded inventions, because the...

We examine the role of patents as signals used to reduce information asymmetries in entrepreneurial finance. A theoretical model gives conditions for a unique separating equilibrium in which startup founders file for patents to signal invention quality to investors, as well as appropriating...