In this article, we construct a model to study competing payment networks, where networks offer differentiated products in terms of benefits to consumers and merchants. We study market equilibria for a variety of market structures: duopolistic competition and cartel, symmetric and asymmetric...

In this article, we construct a two-period model to investigate what market conditions would support a credit card equilibrium given two commonly observed credit card pricing conventions consumers rarely are charged higher prices for using their credit cards and if they payoff their credit card...

During the last decade, debit card transactions grew rapidly in most advanced countries. While check usage declined and has almost disappeared in some countries, the stock of currency in circulation has not declined as fast. We use panel estimation techniques to analyze the change in...

Three main forces—innovations, incentives, and regulation—have affected the migration to more efficient payment mechanisms. Though several payment alternatives have been introduced recently, many have not been widely adopted. The Chicago Fed held a conference to explore why certain payment...

The migration to more efficient payment mechanisms is affected by innovations, incentives, and regulation. While advances in technology have yielded numerous payment method alternatives, many have not been widely adopted. A recent Chicago Fed conference explored why certain payment innovations...

The costs and benefits to payment system participants can differ depending on which payment mechanism is used. The authors specifically explore the costs and benefits of prepaid card applications versus other payment instruments, such as cash, checks, and debit cards, for certain payment...

This article surveys the recent theoretical literature on payment cards (focusing on debit and credit cards) and studies this research's possible implications for the current public policy debate over payment card networks and the pricing of their services for both consumers and merchants.

We model side payments in a competitive credit-card market. If competitive retailers charge a single (higher) price to cover the cost of accepting cards, banks must subsidize convenience users to prevent them from defecting to merchants who do not accept cards. The side payments will be financed...