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This paper considers a principal-agent model with auditing and collusion, in which the audit costs are a convex function of the audit reliability. The focus of interest is the question of the audit reliability chosen by the principal. It turns out that the optimal audit reliability strongly...
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This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
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We analyze the efficiency of indexing executive pay by calibrating the standard model of executive compensation to a large sample of US CEOs. The main finding is that benefits from indexing stock options are small and that fully indexing them would increase compensation costs by more than 50%...
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