Showing 1 - 10 of 601
This paper develops an equilibrium matching model for a competitive CEO market in which CEOs’ wage and perks are both endogenously determined by bargaining between firms and CEOs. In stable matching equilibrium, firm size, wage, perks and talent are all positively related. Perks are more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040820
We shed light on whether stock option repricings are in the best interests of shareholders by conducting an event study that uses non-contaminated and timely announcements of stock option repricings by Canadian firms. While U.S. firms publicly disclose their repricings in proxy statements months...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122788
This article sets out the case for repealing the $1 million tax cap on executive pay. The cap is easily avoided and, when not avoided, widely ignored. Since enactment in 1993, the cap has had little effect in reducing executive pay or in linking pay to performance. Even worse, the cap increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965067
This study introduces a new dimension, age diversity of non-CEO executives, which moderates the relationship between promotion-based tournament incentives, measured as the pay gap between the CEO and non-CEO executives, and firm performance. For a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917562
This paper analyzes the influence of stakeholder orientation on the design of managerial incentives. Our tests exploit the quasi-natural experiment provided by the staggered adoption of directors' duties laws (i.e., state-level laws that explicitly expand board members' duties to act in the best...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891837
Using a regulation that increased portfolio disclosure frequency of US mutual funds as an exogenous shock shortening funds’ investment horizon, we find that affected funds influence portfolio firms to reduce the pay duration of their executives to incentivize them to also have shorter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236397
Empirical research on the principal-agent model has focused almost exclusively on the incentives provided to chief executive officers. However, the model is also directly relevant to the incentives provided to other top executives. Furthermore, the extent to which other executives will be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027832
Family firms comprise more than one third of U.S. public firms. They differ significantly from widely-held firms in their promotion-based tournament environment and agency conflicts. These differences are likely to affect the design and efficacy of compensation incentives. However, most existing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013492593
This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013145369
In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases where firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period from 1995 to 2006. We find that firms with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065225