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Distorted performance measures in compensation contracts elicit suboptimal behavioral responses that may even prove to be dysfunctional (gaming). This paper applies the empirical test developed by Courty and Marschke (2008) to detect whether the widely used class of Residual Income based...
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Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent's optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003557359
Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376645
Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343251
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Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent's optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318660