The term “liberty of contract” is usually associated with the doctrine that the due process clause of the United States Constitution prohibits or should prohibit the State from regulating contracts between private individuals. Many libertarians and free-market advocates embrace the liberty...

This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to...

Apparently judges’ decisions are not motivated by maximizing their own profit. The literature uses two strategies to explain this observation: judges care about the long-term monetary consequences for themselves, or individuals who are more strongly motivated by the common good self-select...

We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifiable performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...

We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifi- able performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...

Contract law does not adequately account for the harms that we can inflict on third parties by joint agreement. Some terms are prohibited, and some third party interests are protected by independent causes of action. But a wide variety of legal interests may be burdened by other people’s...

This paper presents an application of the relational contracts theory and specifically of the theory of norms to a paradigm relation, i.e. a management contract. In this analysis we use MacNeil's norms model and we test in relation to twelve unilateral and bilateral obligations of a standard...

Long and specific Contracts in the US and short and ambiguous contracts in Japan are a stereotypical comparison of the contracting practices in both countries. Such characteristics of written contracts are understood as sticky. Based on a semi-structured interview of Japanese auto and...

The conventional wisdom is that property rules induce more (and more efficient) contracting, and that when faced with rigid property rules, intellectual property owners will contract into more flexible liability rules. A series of recent, private copyright deals show some intellectual property...

We investigate how payoff-irrelevant terms can negatively impact relational contracts. In a lab experiment we compare two economically equivalent contracts - a fixed-term renewable and an open-ended at-will contract. Each contract provides partners with full flexibility regarding the length and...