In der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Forschung wird seit langem diskutiert, wie Karriereüberlegungen die Leistung am Arbeitsplatz beeinflussen. Ist eine leistungsorientierte Bezahlung, zum Beispiel in Form von Boni, überhaupt notwendig, um junge Arbeitnehmer zu motivieren? Diese könnten...

The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise (Holmström, 1982/1999). In contrast, we show that effort can increase with belief precision if promotions to better-paid jobs make the returns to reputation non-linear. In...

It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...

It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...

It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...