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Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - 2020

small. The principal prefers direct communication with the supervisor and agent if the supervisor's budget is sufficiently …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160310

Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1547-1586

small. The principal prefers direct communication with the supervisor and agent if the supervisor's budget is sufficiently …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488

Delegation as a signal : implicit communication with full cooperation

Franaszek, Joanna - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015374914

Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe project (exploitation) or a risky project (exploration) at each instance. We argue that there are substantial efficiency gains from rewarding minor innovations above their social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886

Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown

Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079

Contracts that Reward Innovation : Delegated Experimentation with an Informed Principal

Sun, Yiman - 2018

We examine the nature of contracts that optimally reward innovations in a risky environment, when the innovator is privately informed about the quality of her innovation and must engage an agent to develop it. We model the innovator as a principal who has private but imperfect information about...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932065

Optimal sequential delegation

Kovác, Eugen; Krähmer, Daniel - 2013

The paper extends the optimal delegation framework pioneered by Holmström (1977, 1984) to a dynamic environment where, at the outset, the agent privately knows his ability to interpret decision relevant private information received later on. We show that any mechanism can be implemented by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198973

Delegation and nonmonetary incentives ; [1]

Ambrus, Attila; Egorov, Georgij V. - 2015

In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524157

Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication

Bester, Helmut; Strausz, Roland - 2004 - Version 1.3, December 2004

commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly … restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In addition, general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of … the message spaces of the communication device. An example illustrates our arguments and the suboptimality of one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361996

Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018

Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706