We examine a setting in which managers have differential career concerns and firm performance is publicly observed using disaggregated measures that are incrementally informative but costly to contract upon. In such a setting, when do firms contract on aggregated rather than disaggregated...

The Evans, Kim, Nagarajan, and Patro (2010) (EKNP) study maps rich survey data into plausible proxies for an array of conceptual variables of interest. It documents novel empirical evidence of determinants of the use of contractible performance measures and demonstrates the importance of...

This study uses principal agent analysis to investigate how the principal’s use of performance measures in the agent’s compensation contract are affected by (1) links between performance measures and (2) substitute and complementary characteristics of an agent’s efforts. We show that the...

This paper examines the effects of mandated disclosure on the design of contracts and induced behavior in the presence of career concerns. We analyze the impact of two key properties of a mandated performance measure that is publicly disclosed: its sensitivity to the agent's effort and its...