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Bonus question : does flexible incentive pay dampen unemployment dynamics?

Gaur, Meghana; Grigsby, John; Hazell, Jonathon; Ndiaye, … - 2023

We introduce dynamic incentive contracts into a model of unemployment dynamics and present three results. First, wage … cyclicality from incentives does not dampen unemployment dynamics: the response of unemployment to shocks is first … cyclicality from bargaining dampens unemployment dynamics through the standard mechanism. Third, our calibrated model suggests 46 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014390530

Bonus question : does flexible incentive pay dampen unemployment dynamics?

Gaur, Meghana; Grigsby, John; Hazell, Jonathon - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014429746

Bonus question : does flexible incentive pay dampen unemployment dynamics?

Gaur, Meghana; Hazell, Jonathon; Ndiaye, Abdoulaye - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014372013

Insurance and asymmetric information in wage contracts : evidence from an online experiment

Herbst, Daniel - 2025

For workers facing uncertain output, fixed-wage contracts provide implicit insurance compared to self-employment or performance-based pay. But like any insurance product, these contracts are prone to market distortions through moral hazard and adverse selection. Using a model of wage contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015414158

Evidence on Incentive Effects of Subjective Performance Evaluations

Riphahn, Regina T. - 2011

The authors investigate the effect of managerial performance evaluation styles on employee work effort. Using panel data on 4,080 employees in a Swiss unit of an international company for the period 1999-2002, they test two hypotheses using paid and unpaid overtime work as effort indicators. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125219

Setting incentives : temporary performance premiums versus promotion tournaments

Meier, Volker - 2001

Two alternative relative compensation schemes are compared with respect to total output that can be generated at a given sum of salaries. While the promotion regime guarantees that any salary increase is permanent, the premium system allows a reduction in the income of an agent to the base...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398044

Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO Turnover

Huang, Peggy - 2014

Using hand-collected data, we document the details of the ex-ante severance contracts and the ex-post separation pay given to S&P500 CEOs upon departing from their companies. We analyze what determines whether or not a departing CEO receives separation pay in excess of her severance contract. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067541

Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO Turnover

Goldman, Eitan - 2014

Using hand-collected data, we document the details of the ex-ante severance contract and the ex-post separation pay given to S&P500 CEOs upon departing from their companies. We analyze what determines whether or not a departing CEO receives separation pay in excess of her severance contract. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068439

Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185

Bonus and Malus in Principal-Agent Relations with Fixed Pay and Real Effort

Kirstein, Annette - 2008

Drawing on the proposer-responder game examined by Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund (2003), I experimentally test four variations of a principal-agent relationship with fixed pay and real effort. Depending on the treatment, the principal can voluntarily, but at her own expense, (1) only reward...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769841