We study S&P 500 firms’ disclosure of relative performance evaluation (RPE) details in their first proxy statement filing after the effective date of an SEC rule mandating expanded executive compensation disclosures. Using theoretically-developed implicit techniques to detect RPE use, we...

In the empirical estimation of the relation between CEO pay and both firm and peer performance, researchers typically include conventional accounting-based measures that reflect firm performance net of executive pay expense. We analytically show that when firms evaluate CEO performance relative...

In this paper, the principal rewards an agent's farsighted effort both in the short- and long-term, with the short-term reward based on a noisy, forward-looking performance measure and the long-term reward based on a potentially less noisy, trailing performance measure. The main result is that...

We model relative performance evaluation (RPE) when a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has the power to opportunistically influence the design of RPE by choosing the weight on an index-based peer group or by customizing the selection of peers comprising a peer group. A powerful CEO compares the...

The Evans, Kim, Nagarajan, and Patro (2010) (EKNP) study maps rich survey data into plausible proxies for an array of conceptual variables of interest. It documents novel empirical evidence of determinants of the use of contractible performance measures and demonstrates the importance of...