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Lower salaries and no options : the optimal structure of executive pay

Dittmann, Ingolf; Maug, Ernst - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002111567

Lower salaries and no options : the optimal structure of executive pay

Maug, Ernst; Dittmann, Ingolf - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015204107

Restricting CEO pay

Dittmann, Ingolf; Maug, Ernst; Zhang, Dan - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 17 (2011) 4, pp. 1200-1220

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009299000

Lower salaries and no options? : on the optimal structure of executive pay

Dittmann, Ingolf; Maug, Ernst - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 62 (2007) 1, pp. 303-343

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003425906

Warum optimale Anreizverträge keine Optionen enthalten

Dittmann, Ingolf; Maug, Ernst - In: Funktionsfähigkeit und Stabilität von Finanzmärkten …, (pp. 1-25). 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003249869

Lower salaries and no options : the optimal structure of executive pay

Maug, Ernst - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013443337

The relative performance puzzle

Maug, Ernst - In: Schmalenbach business review : sbr 52 (2000) 1, pp. 3-24

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001473625

Herding and delegated portfolio management : the impact of relative performance evaluation on asset allocation

Maug, Ernst; Naik, Narayan Y. - In: The quarterly journal of finance 1 (2011) 2, pp. 265-292

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009309750

The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation

Focke, Florens; Maug, Ernst; Niessen-Ruenzi, Alexandra - In: Journal of financial economics 123 (2017) 2, pp. 313-336

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011748758

How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?

Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949