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, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of … motives in managers' portfolio choices. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411812
In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948
For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068058
Performance-based pay is an important instrument to align the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders …. However, recent evidence suggests that high-powered incentives also provide managers with incentives to manipulate the firm …'s reported earnings. The previous literature has focused primarily on Chief Executive Officers, but managers further down in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112655
and control or in some situations even to fire and replace the executive managers. This means that their performance as … supervisors is totally different from the performance of the supervised executive managers and even the company at large. Moreover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014036582
Despite the many undesirable outcomes of corporate misconduct, scholars have an inadequate understanding of corporate misconduct's causes and mechanisms. We extend the behavioral theory of the firm, which traditionally assumes away the possibility of firm impropriety, to develop hypotheses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224631
Executive compensation serves as a metric by which investors measure the quality of a firm's governance. In this paper, I explore how the signaling role of executive compensation impacts the compensation decisions of boards. I show that reputational concerns often cause boards to adopt pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012732156
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