Showing 1 - 10 of 30
In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521215
In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521683
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because public signals are more informative about the likely behavior of others. We present an experiment in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061301
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937803
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009787097
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010410638
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003691275
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011393060
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316251
In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318830