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The market for congressional votes : is timing of contributions everything?

Stratmann, Thomas - In: The journal of law & economics 41 (1998) 1, pp. 85-113

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001240182

Are contributors rational? : Untangling strategies of political action committees

Stratmann, Thomas - In: Journal of political economy 100 (1992) 3, pp. 647-664

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001129410

Can special interests buy congressional votes? : Evidence from financial services legislation

Stratmann, Thomas - In: The journal of law & economics 45 (2002) 2,1, pp. 345-373

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001724637

What do campaign contributions buy? : deciphering causal effects of money and votes

Stratmann, Thomas - In: Southern economic journal 57 (1991) 3, pp. 606-620

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001101623

Do strict electoral campaign finance rules limit corruption?

Stratmann, Thomas - In: CESifo DICE report : journal for institutional comparisons 1 (2003) 1, pp. 24-27

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001790823

Tainted money? : Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending

Stratmann, Thomas - 2003

Campaign expenditures are not effective in increasing candidates' vote shares if voters do not respond to the advertisement when they believe that campaign expenditures are financed with "tainted money". In this situation, limiting contributions may reduce the number of policy favors that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001912344