Authoritarian dominant parties are said to ensure elite loyalty by providing elites with regularized opportunities for career advancement. This paper uses data on the distribution of leadership posts in Russia’s regional legislatures (1999-2010) to conduct the first systematic test of this...

Scholars have identified many ways that politicians use carrots, such as vote buying, to mobilize voters, but have paid far less attention to how they use sticks, such as voter intimidation. We develop a simple argument which suggests that voter intimidation should be especially likely where...

Dominant parties are known to extend the longevity of authoritarian rule. If this is so, why do leaders and elites in many non-democratic regimes refrain from investing in dominant parties? This paper examines why dominant parties emerge in some non-democracies, but not in others. Where existing...

A number of studies show that autocracies with ruling parties are more long-lived than those without. Much of the literature attributes this to party institutionalization at the elite-level, which is said to reduce elite schisms. Others point to the ability of grassroots party organizations to...

This paper examines the electoral performance of Russia’s hegemonic party, United Russia. Where existing accounts of hegemonic party performance focus on regime leaders, the party leadership, opposition forces, or society as the main actors, the explanation offered here focuses on regional...