This paper introduces a new explanation for political budget cycles: politicians have stronger incentives to increase spending around elections in the presence of younger political parties. Previous research has shown that political budget cycles are larger when voters are uninformed about...

The literature on political budget cycles, i.e. fluctuations in the budget balance during elections, largely assumes governments to be unitary actors. However, in many political systems, political parties share governing responsibility in a coalition. This article examines the intra-coalition...

Recent research has focused on the role of the political and institutional context for the occurrence of political budget cycles, i.e. fluctuations in the budget balance when elections loom. This study turns to the economic factors. A formal model predicts that higher economic volatility...

Regulatory theory assumes that national governments seek to constrain undesirable firm behavior, either through direct governmental oversight, or through oversight delegated to non-governmental organizations. We reverse that assumed relationship with the first study investigating when and how...

This paper introduces a new explanation for political budget cycles: politicians have stronger incentives to increase spending around elections in the presence of younger political parties. Previous research has shown that political budget cycles are larger when voters are uninformed about...

This paper introduces a new explanation for political budget cycles: politicians have stronger incentives to increase spending around elections in the presence of younger political parties. Previous research has shown that political budget cycles are larger when voters are uninformed about...

Governments can finance fiscal expansions with debt to appear competent and boost their electoral prospects, resulting in a political budget cycle. This article shows that economic disturbances blur competence signals, dampening political budget cycles. Economic disturbances can be construed at...