We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production generates pollution and public firms are less efficient than private ones. In a differential game we compare (i) the Markov-Perfect Nash equilibrium under social planning;...

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...

We revisit the debate on the optimal number of firms in the commons in a differential oligopoly game in which firms are either quantity-or price-setting agents. Production exploits a natural resource and involves a negative externality. We calculate the number of firms maximising industry...

We revisit the well known differential Cournot game with polluting emissions dating back to Benchekroun and Long (1998), proposing a version of the model in which environmental taxation is levied on emissions rather than the environmental damage. This allows to attain strong time consistency...

Relying on a standard formulation of dynamic models of pollution abatement, we propose a competition among countries committed to maximize their respective welfare without any form of agreement. When there exists a threshold level for the stock of pollution above which a catastrophe occurs, it...

This paper offers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluti ng emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then...

We adopt a stepwise approach to the analysis of a dynamic oligopoly game in which production makes use of a natural resource and pollutes the environment, starting with simple models where firms' output is not a function of the natural resource to end up with a full-fledged model in which (i)...