We derive optimal input taxes to control stock pollution problems generated by heterogeneous agents. The taxes vary over time and in response to differences of asset quality and technology choice. We also derive second-best policies and compare them to the efficient policy and also among...

We formulate and study a nonlinear game of n symmetric countries that produce, pollute, and spend part of their revenue on pollution mitigation and environmental adaptation. The optimal emission, adaptation, and mitigation investments are analyzed in both Nash equilibrium and cooperative cases....

Different regulatory bodies tend to develop environmental policies not recognizing the interdependencies between externalities. For example, one authority may regulate a stock pollution and another a flow pollution that result from the same activity. This study introduces a two-phase...

We consider firms combining variable inputs and heterogeneous capital goods. Input use may cause simultaneous flow and stock externalities (e.g., air pollution/ climate change). Regulatory bodies typically develop separate policies for each externality but do not recognize that many...