We show that U.S. industrial firms invest heavily in non-cash, risky financial assets such as corporate debt, equity, and mortgage-backed securities. Risky assets represent 40% of firms' financial portfolios, or 6% of total book assets. We present a formal model to assess the optimality of risky...

We study the agency implications of increased disclosure using a regulatory change in the mutual fund industry as an experimental setting. This quasi-natural experiment mandated more frequent portfolio disclosure, which we show imposes managerial skill re-assessment risks from investors on funds...

Because analysts strategically allocate more effort to portfolio firms that are relatively more important for their careers, a firm's information environment is impacted by other firms covered by its analysts. Controlling for analyst and firm characteristics, an analyst makes more accurate,...

Studies of institutional monitoring focus on the fraction of the firm held by institutions. We focus on the fraction of the institution's portfolio represented by the firm. In the context of acquisitions, we hypothesize that institutional monitoring will be greatest when the target firm...