Experimental evidence suggests that individuals are more risk averse when they perceive risk that is gradually resolved over time. We address these findings by studying a decision maker (DM) who has recursive, non-expected utility preferences over compound lotteries. DM has preferences for...

We study a two-stage choice problem, where alternatives are allocations between the decision maker (DM) and a passive recipient. The recipient observes choice behavior in stage two, while stage one choice is unobserved. Choosing selfishly in stage two, in the face of a fairer available...

We study a decision maker (DM) who has recursive preferences over compound lotteries and who cares about the way uncertainty is resolved over time. DM has preferences for one-shot resolution of uncertainty (PORU) if he always prefers any compound lottery to be resolved in a single stage. We...

Maximizing the probability of bypassing an aspiration level, and taking increasing risks to recover previous losses are well-documented behavioral tendencies. They are compatible with individual utility functions that are S-shaped, as suggested in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). We...

This chapter provides a critical review of the theories of decision making under risk and under uncertainty and the notion of choice-based subjective probabilities. It includes formal statements and discussions of the various models, including their analytical frameworks, the corresponding...

The term ‘preference imprecision' seems to have different meanings to different people. In the literature, one can find references to a number of expressions. For example: vagueness, incompleteness, randomness, unsureness, indecisiveness and thick indifference curves. Some of these are...

We propose and axiomatically characterize a representation of ambiguity sensitive preferences. The distinguishing feature of our axiomatization is that we do not require preferences to be event-wise separable over any domain of acts. Even without any such separability restrictions, we are able...

One apparent reason for deferring a decision – abstaining from choosing, leaving the decision open to be taken by someone else, one’s later self, or nature – is for lack of sufficient confidence in the relevant beliefs. This paper develops an axiomatic theory of decision in situations...

We axiomatize a new class of recursive dynamic models that capture subjective constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can obtain, pay attention to, or absorb, via a Markov Decision Process for Information Choice (MIC). An MIC is a subjective decision process that specifies what...

This paper extends Savage's subjective approach to probability and utility from decision problems under exogenous uncertainty to choice in strategic environments. Interactive uncertainty is modeled both explicitly, using hierarchies of preference relations, the analogue of beliefs hierarchies,...