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We investigate whether violations of canonical axioms of choice under risk are mistakes or a manifestation of true preferences. First, we elicit axiom and gamble preferences and then allow subjects to revise their potentially conflicting preferences. Among the behavioral patterns that allow for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014578322
We investigate whether violations of canonical axioms of choice under risk are mistakes or a manifestation of true preferences. First, we elicit axiom and gamble preferences and then allow subjects to revise their potentially conflicting preferences. Among the behavioral patterns that allow for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014556632
In this study, we enrich a standard principal-agent model with hidden action by introducing salience-biased perception on the agent's side. The agent's misguided focus on salient payoffs, which leads the agent's and the principal's probability assessments to diverge, has two effects: First, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172380
We present a theory of context-dependent risk preferences under which within-state payoff comparisons and regret aversion shape decisions. Defining the attraction and compromise effect in reference to a state-space-based description of the choice problem, we show that our theory can account for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015182570
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In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons influence agents incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects, agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430294
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012149670
Earlier work has shown that procrastination can be explained by quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We present a model of effort choice over time that shifts the focus away from completion to performance on a single task. We show that quasi-hyperbolic discounting is detrimental for performance. More...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264914
This paper extends the standard principal-agent model with moral hazard to allow for agents having reference- dependent preferences according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The main finding is that loss aversion leads to fairly simple contracts. In particular, when shifting the focus from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264926