We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type of private information the customer possesses...

The canonical selection contracting programme takes the agent's participation decision as deterministic and finds the optimal contract, typically satisfying this constraint for the worst type. Upon weakening this assumption of known reservation values by introducing independent randomness into...

This chapter surveys the developments in price discrimination theory as it applies to imperfectly competitive markets. Broad themes and conclusions are discussed in the areas of first-, second- and third-degree price discrimination, pricing under demand uncertainty, bundling and behavior-based...

This chapter surveys recent theoretical developments in the intersection of price discrimination and imperfect competition, emphasizing how the introduction of competition fundamentally alters some well-established results derived from models of monopoly pricing

We study competitive nonlinear pricing in a model involving simultaneously horizontal and vertical product differentiation. It is a particular case of a more general model of optimal contracting with uncertain participation that we study elsewhere (Rochet-Stole (1997))