We relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information about the economy. Assuming instead that governments must obtain information from firms, we examine firms’ incentive to disclose information to the governments in the...

We examine the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information. Assuming instead that firms have better information, we explore the long-term incentives for firms to consistently disclose information to their governments in the standard...

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of...

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of...