We examine the value of price commitment in a nonprofit organization using individual level purchases over a series of concert performances. To decide on a pricing policy, the performing arts organization must be able to accurately measure when each ticket will be sold and what type of audience...

Many firms have difficulty evaluating the impact of their pricing policy, which further inhibits their ability to design and implement dynamic pricing. We address this issue in the context of single-game ticket pricing for a Major League Baseball franchise. We develop and estimate a...

Problem Definition: We explore how to design professional services in markets that cater to customers with differential usage capabilities. Professional customers avail the service and tailor it to their use, whereas amateur customers, lacking the relevant expertise, obtain the service through a...

We study the offering of discretionary services, those for which longer processing times yield higher quality, but also create more system congestion. Facing delay-sensitive customers that are heterogeneous in quality sensitivity, firms offer a service line (i.e., a menu of service variants...

In this paper, we study the impact of consumer-generated quality information (e.g., consumer reviews) on a firm's dynamic pricing strategy in presence of strategic consumers. Such information is useful, not only to the consumers that have not yet purchased the product, but also to the firm. The...

We consider a model of intermediated trade for a financial asset. Agents' valuation for the asset includes both a private and a common value component. A third party posts a price at which trade can occur, and a buyer and seller simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject the trade. We...

We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing technologies (PP). These technologies enable first-degree price discrimination: firms charge different prices to different consumers, based on their willingness to pay. We first show that, even...