In economies with uncertain delivery, agents trade their endowments for lists instead of bundles. A list specifies a set of bundles such that the agent has the right to receive one of them. In this paper, with continuity conditions on private beliefs about the bundle that will be delivered, we...

In an economy with private information, we introduce the notion of objects of choice as lists of bundles out of which the market selects one for delivery. This leads to an extension of the model of Arrow-Debreu that is used to study ex-ante trade with private state verification. The model does...

We propose the notion of objects of choice as uncertain consumption bundles, extending the formulation of Arrow (1953). Agents sign “contracts for uncertain delivery”, which specify a list of alternative bundles, instead of a single one. This allows us to incorporate uncertainty and...

In economies with uncertain delivery, objects of choice are lists of bundles instead of bundles. Agents trade their endowments for lists, and it is the market that selects one of the bundles in the list for actual delivery. Knowledge of the selection mechanism allows agents to predict the bundle...