, Keynes rejected additivity except as a special case. This is the major difference between Ramsey and Keynes. Keynes believed … immediately leads to uncertainty. Uncertainty requires the existence of non additivity. Keynes made it explicit in Part II of the … follow Keynes’s analysis in Part II of the TP. This, for instance, was a severe problem also for both F Y Edgeworth and E B …

The Townshend–Keynes exchanges over decision making, weight of the argument (evidence), non numerical probabilities … (Keynes’s term for Boole’s constituent probabilities, used in The Laws of Thought in 1854, that appears on page 163 of the A … Probability, the General Theory,and the 1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics, reveal that Keynes’s discussions about uncertainty in …

The operational definitions of uncertainty used by John M. Keynes and Frank H. Knight are based on missing information … significantly different from the one advanced by Keynes and Knight. Uncertainty, for de Finetti and Savage, can only exist in the … uncertainty and the Keynes-Knight approach. This claim, however, loses much of its appeal once it is realized that the discussion …

J M Keynes was an acknowl ... …

J M Keynes rejected Ramsey's subjective theory of probability in general. He did accept Ramsey's betting quotient …, additive, precise, exact, definite, single number answers. In general, Keynes's probabilities were indeterminate, interval … Russell, and Edwin Bidell Wilson all recognized the interval valued nature of Keynes's probabilities (See my Reviewing the …

Probability and the concept of uncertainty in the General Theory both follow directly from Keynes's analysis and application of …'s definition of uncertainty, not only have nothing to do with the work of J M Keynes, but are directly in conflict with it. Neither …

Historical, as well as practically all current, assessments of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability suffer immensely …. Unfortunately, in skipping this part of the book, Borel completely overlooked Keynes's explicit discussions about additivity being a … special case while non(sub) additivity was the general case. Keynes then followed this analysis with his interval valued …

Economists, working in the Heterodox schools of economics, have severely confused Keynes's interval valued probability …–weight of the evidence approach to decision making from the A Treatise on Probability, that Keynes integrated into the General … theorist like Keynes, is that decision makers are horribly ignorant of the laws of the probability calculus when making …