Showing 1 - 10 of 85
Frank P Ramsey did not consider the possibility of representing the concept of probability by an interval valued approach in his lifetime. Ramsey considered probability to be either ordinal or numerical. There was absolutely no room for interval estimates and interval probability in his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122608
The Townshend–Keynes exchanges over decision making, weight of the argument (evidence), non numerical probabilities (Keynes’s term for Boole’s constituent probabilities, used in The Laws of Thought in 1854, that appears on page 163 of the A Treatise on Probability in chapter 15 on inexact...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014104170
Starting with J. Muth’s unsupported and unsupportable claims, originally made in 1961, that “rational expectations” were subjective probability distributions that were distributed around a known, true, objective probability distribution, various economists have provided the same type of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014109858
J M Keynes rejected Ramsey's subjective theory of probability in general. He did accept Ramsey's betting quotient approach in the special case where the weight of the evidence, w, equaled one so that all the probabilities were linear, additive, precise, exact, definite, single number answers. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965581
It is a straight forward exercise to demonstrate that the concept of the weight of the evidence in the A Treatise on Probability and the concept of uncertainty in the General Theory both follow directly from Keynes's analysis and application of Boole's development of the concept of upper and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012948978
Economists, working in the Heterodox schools of economics, have severely confused Keynes's interval valued probability–weight of the evidence approach to decision making from the A Treatise on Probability, that Keynes integrated into the General Theory by way of his definition of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950042
In chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability, Keynes made it very clear that ordinal, qualitative probability did not apply in many cases. Further, ordinal probability was very weak as far as providing useful information upon which a decision maker could act. However, this did not mean that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950375