Under multiplicative separability of the cost function, this paper investigates the identification of the procurement model. Moreover, we characterize the model restrictions on observables and show its observational equivalence to one where the function of private information is the identity.

A seminal result in the theory of competitive bidding holds that the buyer can lower the expected awarding price of a procurement contract by setting a reserve price below her opportunity cost for realizing the project. In this paper, we first provide a non-technical explanation for this result,...

We study a new market design for K-12 school broadband procurement that switched from school-specific bidding to a system that bundled schools into groups. Using an event study approach, we estimate the program reduced internet prices by 37% per Mbps per month while increasing bandwidth by 500%....

We study asymmetric first-price procurements with unobserved heterogeneity and asymmetric risk-aversion. For this model, we propose a new empirical method that allows us to predict the expected procurement cost at any reserve price. Being able to perform such detailed counterfactual analysis is...

We propose an empirical method to analyze data from first-price procurements where bidders are asymmetric in their risk-aversion (CRRA) coefficients and distributions of private costs. Our Bayesian approach evaluates the likelihood by solving type-symmetric equilibria using the boundary-value...

We evaluate the effects of bundling demand for broadband internet by K-12 schools. In 2014, New Jersey switched from decentralized procurements to a new procurement system that bundled schools into four regional groups. Using an event study approach, we find that, on average, prices for...