I present a model in which randomly matched pairs of people bargain over the division of output in each period. Output can be consumed or stored for later consumption. People are identical except possibly in wealth (i.e., the stored output). The one-period utility is linear except for the...

I study the role the agent's wealth plays in the principal-agent matching with moral hazard and limited liability. I consider wealth and talent as the agent's type, and size as the firm's (principal's) type. Because utility is not perfectly transferable in this setup, I use generalized...

We identify conditions under which a bargainer makes inefficiently large (small) investments in search for information about the opponent's reservation price. The analysis starts with the observation that a player will invest too much (too little) if the opponent's expected payoff is decreasing...

This paper analyzes assortative matching between employers and employees and its interrelations with the employment density of local labor markets in Germany. I devote attention to the identiication of accurate quality measures: plants' total factor productivity and workers' fixed effect. Two...

This paper shows the importance of technological synergies among heterogeneous firms for aggregate fluctuations. First, we document six novel empirical facts using microdata that suggest the existence of important technological synergies between trading firms, the presence of positive...

How are substitution in the spatial and in the temporal sense connected? Can estimates based on data with spatial variation be transmitted into values appropriate for exploring temporal variation, and vice versa? This paper, building on, inter alia, Frisch (1959), attempts to give some...