We document that, when revising their short-term earnings forecasts in response to management guidance, analysts wishing to curry favor with management weight the guidance more heavily than predicted based on the credibility and usefulness of the guidance. This overweighting of guidance is...

We document that, when revising their short-term earnings forecasts in response to management guidance, analysts wishing to curry favor with management weight the guidance more heavily than predicted based on the credibility and usefulness of the guidance. This overweighting of guidance is...

This paper investigates the costs, benefits and frequency of management earnings guidance issued by firms manipulating earnings. We find that, when manipulations are detected, misstating firms issuing guidance and their managers incur additional legal costs, as reflected in the higher settlement...

We investigate if high-ability managers are more likely to intentionally smooth earnings, a form of earnings management, and when they are more likely to do so. Although prior studies provide evidence that high-ability managers report higher quality earnings, the literature does not indicate...

We examine the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings information in quarters containing transitory gains to investigate whether the primary motivation for these managers to disclose non-GAAP earnings is to inform or mislead. In this setting, non-GAAP earnings are more informative than GAAP earnings,...