Information aggregation mechanisms are designed explicitly for collecting and aggregating dispersed information. An excellent example of the use of this "wisdom of crowds" is a prediction market. The purpose of our Twitter-based prediction market is to suggest that carefully designed market...

We analyze experimental evidence on whether untrained subjects can predict how trustworthy an individual is. Two players on a TV show play a high stakes prisoner's dilemma with pre-play communication. Our subjects report probabilistic beliefs that each player cooperates, before and after...

We describe a methodology for making counterfactual predictions when the information held by strategic agents is a latent parameter. The analyst observes behavior which is rationalized by a Bayesian model in which agents maximize expected utility, given partial and differential information...

We describe a methodology for making counterfactual predictions when the information held by strategic agents is a latent parameter. The analyst observes behavior which is rationalized by a Bayesian model in which agents maximize expected utility given partial and differential information about...

We study an adverse-selection model in which the distribution of the asset is affected by unobservable actions of the seller. The seller's equilibrium behavior is characterized by a risk-seeking disposition, and a competitive market, in which the underlying distribution of the traded asset is...

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with...

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for all possible private information structures that the agents may have. Our characterization of these robust predictions relies on an epistemic result which establishes a relationship between the set...

This paper studies the effects of information exchange and social networks on the performance of prediction markets with endogenous information acquisition. We provide a game-theoretic framework to resolve the question: Can social networks and information exchange promote the forecast efficiency...

We study forecast dispersion in a finite-player forecasting game modeled as an aggregate game with payoff externalities and dispersed information. In the game, each agent cares about being accurate as well as about the distance of his forecast from the average forecast; and with a finite number...