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Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and assessment aggregation

Quesada, Antonio - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000978391

(100-200/m)% veto power

Quesada, Antonio - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 57 (2003) 2, pp. 83-92

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001771308

From social choice funftions to dictatorial social welfare functions

Quesada, Antonio (contributor) - In: Economics bulletin : EB (2002)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001740768

Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity

Quesada, Antonio - In: Economics letters 111 (2011) 2, pp. 151-154

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009242388

Manipulability. unanimity, anonymity and merging functions

Quesada, Antonio - In: Social choice and welfare 17 (2000) 3, pp. 481-506

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001498072

Manipulability, Unanimity, Anonymity and Merging Functions

Quesada, Antonio - 2001

A merging (or assessment aggregation) function (see [7]) is a rule that synthesizes several individual assessments, or numerical judgements, by creating a unique "collective" assessment. Individual i can manipulate assessment aggregation if the change in the merged assessment due to a change in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014156988