Bureaucratic compliance is often crucial for political survival, yet eliciting that compliance in weakly institutionalized environments requires that political principals convince agents that their hold on power is secure. We provide a formal model to show that electoral manipulation can help to...

We exploit exogenous variation in the timing of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using hazard analysis, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control (i.e. lack of competition) can explain all of...

Can the selective opening of bank branches and the timing of public bank branch openings turn into a political opportunity? This issue is present in many countries where public-sector banking exists. I explore this question through the lens of Türkiye by studying the effect of political...

Florian Dorn erstellte diesen Beitrag während seines Promotionsstudiums an der Universität München (LMU). Die Studie wurde im September 2020 abgeschlossen und von der Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre als Dissertation angenommen. Die Dissertation trägt zur Empirie der Ökonomie des...

Politicians have limited ability to influence policy. This provides an incentive for politicians to feign, whereby they propose policies that voters demand but then exert little effort toward progressing such policies. This feigning behavior is more likely to occur when the politician's...

This paper presents a tractable and parsimonious theory of political revolutions in societies devoid of democratic processes. I frame a society constituting a ruler seeking to prevent uprising and a revolutionary leader attempting to induce revolt. Both seek to appeal to a populace consisting of...

We review the literature on the political economy of international organizations (IOs). Considering IOs as products of the preferences of various actors rather than monolithic entities we focus on national politicians, international bureaucrats, interest groups, and voters. By looking into the...

This article investigates the patronage phenomenon in the italian, so called, Second Republic. In particular, the analysis argues that (ex) members of parliament are appointed to managerial boards in italian (partially) state-owned enterprises responding to political selection rationales....

We study whether political parties exert precise control over the outcomes of legislative elections. We test for discontinuities in two outcomes that, in the absence of precise control, should be smooth at the threshold that determines control of the legislature: the identity of the party that...