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Collective choice rules on convex restricted domains

Storcken, Ton - 2008

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Tournaments as collective decisions

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Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences

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Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences

Ehlers, Lars H.; Peters, Hans J. M.; Storcken, Ton - In: Journal of economic theory 105 (2002) 2, pp. 408-434

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Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes

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Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets

Maus, Stefan; Peters, Hans J. M.; Storcken, Ton - 2003

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Minimal manipulability : unanimity and nondictatorship

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Minimal manipulability : anonymity and surjectivity

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Minimal manipulability : anonymity and unanimity

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Collective Choice Rules on Convex Restricted Domains

Khare, Shashwat - 2018

We study sets of preferences containing some partial order. It appears that all preferences containing a certain partial order form a convex set of preferences with respect to the betweenness relation induced by the Kemeny distance for preferences. Moreover, the other way round these convex sets...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907656