I contribute to the theory of entangled political economy by showing how entanglement can be characterized in terms of political property rights. A political property right grants its holder a share of decision-making power in a specific context, as well as specifies to whom the costs and...

I criticize contractarian approaches to political economy that assume the insularity of constitutions from ordinary political exchange. Using tools from market process economics, I outline a theory of the political-entrepreneurial process as applied to constitutions. This theory can help us...

This paper traces the normative side of James Buchanan's individualist-subjectivist-contractarian position. The literature on anarchy and radical self-governance treats Buchanan's position, and social contract theory more generally, as a rival rather than allied branch of analysis. However, I...

Constitutional political economy mostly distinguishes between rules and actions, with rules selected prior to actions within those rules. While we accept the coherence of this distinction, we pursue it within an open rather than closed scheme of analysis. Doing this entails recognition that...

I contribute to the theory of entangled political economy by showing how entanglement can be characterized in terms of political property rights. A political property right grants its holder a share of decision-making power in a specific context, as well as specifies to whom the costs and...