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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009243268
This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of "-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003898916
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This paper studies full implementation problems in (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium in finite environments. We restrict the designer to adopt<I>finite</I> mechanisms, thus ruling out integer games. We provide a condition, top-<I>D</I> inclusiveness, that together with set-monotonicity is sufficient for mixed...</i></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100420
This paper studies repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We introduce the condition of dynamic monotonicity and show that it is necessary for repeated implementation in finite as well as infinite horizon problems....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013104359
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin's definition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013152860
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A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin's definition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003885872
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibriumoutcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin’s definition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003866571