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Compellingness in Nash implementation

Chatterji, Shurojit; Kunimoto, Takashi; Salles Ramos, … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013542206

Dictatorial domains

Aswal, Navin; Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001408385

Dictatorial domains

Aswal, Navin; Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 22 (2003) 1, pp. 45-62

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001770432

Mechanism design by observant and informed planners

Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava - In: Review of economic design 26 (2022) 4, pp. 665-677

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013489678

A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains

Chatterji, Shurojit; Zeng, Huaxia - In: Games and economic behavior 137 (2023), pp. 228-269

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013550967

The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domans and lexicographically separable preferences

Chatterji, Shurojit; Roy, Souvik; Sen, Arunava - In: Journal of mathematical economics 48 (2012) 6, pp. 353-366

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689452

Tops-only domains

Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 46 (2011) 2, pp. 255-282

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008826735

A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions

Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; Zeng, Huaxia - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 711-733

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011500770

Random dictatorship domains

Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; Zeng, Huaxia - In: Games and economic behavior 86 (2014), pp. 212-236

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304983

A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions

Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; Zeng, Huaxia - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 711-733

The paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property, is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671964