a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …

auction is the better selling mechanism. However, why exactly an auction should be preferred is unclear. Here we present an …

strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This … feature guarantees an implementation with a descending clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks …

settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an … implementation with a descending-clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such …

procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences … price exceeds the initial price. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, i.e., under … the optimal scoring auction each supplier proposes the standard design. …

strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This … feature guarantees an implementation with a descending clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks …

services per year, we leverage our characterization of the optimal mechanism to study the design of first-price-auction …