Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective market-based corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy...

State-owned enterprises (SOE) are essentially extensions of the government and are therefore responsible for multi-task objectives. The incentive system for SOE managers consists of both monetary compensation and promotion within the bureaucratic system. Political promotion is key to...

This paper investigates the decision to appoint politically connected top executives to Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) when they face distressful conditions and whether such appointments enhance or reduce firm performance and corporate governance in subsequent years. China is the...

Purpose This paper investigates CEO turnover and the usefulness of relative performance evaluation (RPE) as a management incentive in an emerging economy lacking market-based competition. Methodology/approach In a sample of China’s listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the period 2001 to...