economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …

economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but also that the … electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is …

economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …

schemes in order to influence the government's choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition …

&S preferences. Stability of the grand coalition is never reached, but potential internally stable grand coalitions are achieved … eines globalen öffentlichen Gutes – z.B. Klimaschutz - eingeführt. Spieler tragen – wenn sie einer Koalition beitreten …

coalition to coordinate provision. Compared with games with only goods (or only bads) we find larger coalitions in equilibrium …. Specifically, we analyze a game with quadratic benefit- and cost functions and we find the grand coalition to be stable except for … situations where agents have identical or almost identical characteristics. The main driving force of coalition stability is that …

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …