We study a firm's decisions to engage in socially responsible activities, voluntarily report on them and purchase external assurance of the report. In our signaling model, neither firm type nor the level of activity is observed. We show that if voluntary assurance is not too expensive, the firm...

Public information that becomes available after a manager’s initial voluntary disclosure decision creates incentives for her to reconsider and possibly change that decision. We show that if she has private information that is value relevant or that impacts the firms ability to compete in its...

Two–way communication via social media platforms allows the firm to make an initial disclosure decision and then revise it after observing the response on social media to its initial decision. We examine the pressures interactive communications place on disclosure choices and find that...

We study a firm's decisions to engage in socially responsible activities, voluntarily report on them and purchase external assurance of the report. In our signaling model, neither firm type nor the level of activity is observed. We show that if voluntary assurance is not too expensive, the firm...