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Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930793
Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010238945
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010479521
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Journal of Economic Theory', 2014, 153, 33-45.<P> Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257404
Subgroup additivity requires that a rule assigns the same expected ‘relative’ utility to each agent whether an agent’s expected relative utility is calculated from the problem involving all agents or from its sub-problems with a smaller number of agents. In this paper, we investigate its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776942
We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler in Q J Econ 92:671–687, <CitationRef CitationID="CR31">1978</CitationRef>) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993550
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753189
We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler [22]) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though there is no mechanism in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681414
We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of the queueing problem. As a consequence, we provide alternative characterizations of the k-pivotal mechanisms (Mitra and Mutuswami [13]). First, we introduce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011245948
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009777825