We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; a) by having a small...

I consider two seemingly unrelated puzzles; 1. Why is relative performance evaluation (RPE) used less in CEo compensation than agency theory suggests? 2. Why is sometimes, e.g., for fund managers, a mediocre performance more highly rewarded than excellence? I consider a simple tournament model,...

Public social security systems may provide diversification of risks to individuals' life-time income. Capturing that a pay-as-you-go program (paygo) may be considered as a "quasi-asset", we study the optimal size of the social security program as well as the optimal split between a funded part...

Different versions of pay-as-you-go public pension programs may have entirely different effects on the intergenerational distribution of income risk. If the pension benefit is a fixed proportion of previous income, a pay-as-you-go program increases the income risk of all generations. On the...

The paper studies how uncertainty about future trade arrangements affecting firms' competitiveness and market access, may influence firms' investment behaviour and choice of location. Our analysis is based on a model of imperfect competition, and we show that risk aversion is not a necessary...