Maximizing the probability of bypassing an aspiration level, and taking increasing risks to recover previous losses are well-documented behavioral tendencies. They are compatible with individual utility functions that are S-shaped, as suggested in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). We...

The paper generalizes Blackwell's theorem, according to which the welfare effects of an improvement in information are positive to certain class equilibrium production economies. The consumer preferences in this class of economies exhibit either constant relative risk of constant risk aversion...

The paper constructs a theoretical framework in which the value of information in general equilibrium can be linked to the efficiency of the risk sharing mechanism. We demonstrate that in economies with production, information may have negative value even though no risk sharing markets exist. As...

We investigate channels of federally provided income insurance for U.S. States, finding that a major part of federal insurance is provided through transfers. We compare the "bang for the buck" of various fiscal institutions, finding that unemployment benefits are dramatically more efficient in...

We measure the amount of smoothing achieved through various components of the government deficit in Eu and OECD countries. For EU countries, at the 1-year frequency, 13 % of shocks to GDP are smoothed via government consumption, 18 percent via transfers, 5 % via subsidies, while taxes provide no...

A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-take-all game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be...

We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; a) by having a small...

We provide empirical evidence that risk sharing enhances specialization in production. To the best of our knowledge, this well-established and important theoretical proposition has not been tested before. Our empirical procedure is summarized as follows. First, we construct a measure of...

I consider two seemingly unrelated puzzles; 1. Why is relative performance evaluation (RPE) used less in CEo compensation than agency theory suggests? 2. Why is sometimes, e.g., for fund managers, a mediocre performance more highly rewarded than excellence? I consider a simple tournament model,...