Im Mittelpunkt dieser Arbeit steht die Analyse der Vor- und Nachteile einer geglätte-ten versus aktuellen Informationsbasis in einem theoretischen Modell. Am Beispielstabiler Agency-Ratings und volatiler marktbasierter Ratings zeigt sich, dass die Ef-fekte der Berichtsmethode von den...

In this paper, we propose a model of credit rating agencies using the global gamesframework to incorporate information and coordination problems. We introduce arefined utility function of a credit rating agency that, additional to reputationmaximization, also embeds aspects of competition and...

This paper examines why unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ratings. Bothself-selection among issuers and strategic conservatism of rating agencies may be reasonableexplanations. Analyses of default incidences of non-U.S. borrowers between January 1996and December 2006 show that...

In this paper, we propose a model of credit rating agencies using the global games framework to incorporate information and coordination problems. We introduce a refined utility function of a credit rating agency that, additional to reputation maximization, also embeds aspects of competition and...

Generally, information provision and certification have been identified as the major economic functions of rating agencies. This paper analyzes whether the watchlist" (rating review) Instrument has extended the agencies' role towards a monitoring position, as proposed by Boot, Milbourn, and...

Generally, information provision and certification have been identified as the major economic functions of rating agencies. This paper analyzes whether the 'watchlist (rating review) instrument has extended the agencies' role towards a monitoring position, as proposed by Boot, Milbourn, and...

Do rating agencies increase or decrease financial market stability? This paper analyzes whether credit rating agencies may help to avoid inefficient self-fulfilling credit defaults. If investors follow risk-dominant strategies, we show that rating announcements and investors' private information...

Agency conflicts may induce managers to choose inefficiently risky investment projects that benefit stockholders at the expense of debtholders. While private debt contracts often contain covenants restricting investment choices, public debt rarely does. We therefore examine whether credit rating...

Credit rating agencies do not only disclose simple ratings but announce watchlists (rating reviews) and outlooks as well. This paper analyzes the economic function underlying the review procedure. Using Moody's rating data between 1982 and 2004, we find that for borrowers of high...

Generally, information provision and certification have been identified as the major economic functions of rating agencies. This paper analyzes whether the watchlistʺ (rating review) Instrument has extended the agencies' role towards a monitoring position, as proposed by Boot, Milbourn, and...